6aa CONCLUSION
lead to the setting up of an equal number of psychological
types,
However easy it may be to regard the various existing
attitudes from angles other than the one hero adopted, it
would certainly be difficult to adduce evidence against the
existence of psychological types. 1 have no doubt at all
that my opponents will be at .some pains to eliminate the
question of types from the scientific agenda, since, for
every theory of complex psychic processes that makes any
pretence to general validity, the type-problem must, to say
the least, be a very unwelcome obstacle. Following the
analogy of every natural science theory, which also pre-
supposes one and the same fundamental nature, every
theory of complex psychic processes presupposes a uniform
human psychology, But in the case of psychology there
is the peculiar condition that, in the making of its concepts,
the psychic process is not merely the object but at the
same time also the subject, If, therefore, one, assumes,
that in every individual case the subject is one and the
same, it can also be assumed that the subjective process
of the making of concepts is also invariably one and the
same, That this is not so, however, is most impressively
demonstrated by the very existence of the most diverse
views upon the nature of complex psychic processes,
Naturally, a new theory is prone to assume that all other
views have been wrong, and, as a rule, this is solely due to
the fact that the author has a different subjective view
from that of his predecessors, He does not reflect that
.the psychology he sees is his psychology, and, in th<e best
case, the psychology of his type, He, therefore, supposes
that there can only be one true interpretation of the psychic
process which is the object of his investigation, namely that
which agrees with his type, All the other views—I might
almost say all the seven other views—which, after their
kina, are just as true as his, are for him merely errors, In